Contractual Wages and the Wage Cushion under Different Bargaining Settings
利用葡萄牙工人、企业和集体谈判合同的独特数据，分析合同工资和工资缓冲垫（合同工资与实际工资之差）的决定因素，发现工资缓冲垫放大了工人和企业特征的回报，但缩小了工会权力的回报，表明企业特定安排部分抵消了集体谈判。
How does a typically European bargaining system, with collective bargaining and national minimum wage, coexist with low unemployment and high wage flexibility? A unique data set on workers, firms, and collective bargaining contracts in Portugal is used to analyze the determinants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion (difference between contractual and actual wages). The results indicate that the wage cushion stretches the returns to worker and firm attributes, whereas it shrinks the returns to union power. Therefore, firm-specific arrangements partly offset collective bargaining, granting firms certain freedom when setting wages. Contractual wages reflect trade unions' egalitarian policy.