Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority Rule Voting Experiments
过去多数决投票实验中委员会常不选孔多塞胜者（核心），本文设计新投票程序使核心唯一且是子博弈完美均衡，但委员会仍选其他方案。新理论考虑阈值效应，预测选择集，在本文和过去实验中表现良好。
In past experiments, committees voting under majority rule have often failed to choose the Condorcet alternative (the core). Since this failure of theory might be due to flaws in experimental design, we developed a voting procedure in which the unique element in the core is also the unique outcome when a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies for the whole game induces a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies for every subgame. Nevertheless, our committees frequently chose other alternatives. To explain these results, we formulated a new theory that takes account of threshold effects and identifies a selection set predicted to contain the committee's choice. The revised theory performs well both in our experiments and in past experiments.