BUSINESS TAX INTERACTIONS AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH CASE
研究了法国省级政府商业税率的决定因素，发现同级政府间存在显著的税收互动，但省级与上级区域政府间无此互动。
ABSTRACT We study the business tax (“taxe professionnelle”) behavior of the intermediate level (department) of local government in France and test in the same model the two hypotheses that department tax rates are explained by upper tier (region) tax rates and by tax rates chosen by other departments. We first reject the hypothesis of tax interactions between departments and regions, the two upper levels of local governments. Second, we provide evidence that business tax interactions among departments are significant. Including the vertical dimension in the estimated model does not lead to a decrease in the horizontal tax interactions parameter, nor to its nonsignificance.