Negotiating Corporate Combinations: A Theory and Evidence
研究将企业合并谈判建模为所有权分配问题，提出一组公理推导出唯一结果：所有权按各方贡献资源价值比例分配，并用133个企业合并样本验证了该预测。
Managers often use negotiation as a conflict-resolution mechan-ism. We characterize this negotiation process as a problem of dividing ownership in a corporate combination. We specify a set of axioms which imply a unique outcome of this negotiation process. In par-ticular, ownership in the combinedfirm will be divided in proportion to the value of resources contributed by each constituent to the transaction. We tested this prediction of ownership division using a sample of 133 recent corporate combinations. The evidence is con-sistent with this prediction.