Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory
用正式模型推导了动态杠杆理论，说明在位垄断者捆绑互补品可能降低潜在进入者的投资和创新意愿，从而减少消费者福利和社会总福利。
The idea that an incumbent supplier may tie two complementary products to fend off potential entrants is popular among practitioners yet is not fully understood in formal economic theory. This article makes sense of the argument by formally deriving a dynamic version of the old leverage doctrine. We show that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in all complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating. Tie-in sales may reduce consumer and total economic welfare. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.