Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists
研究银行如何筛选因一厢情愿而过度乐观的企业家，发现竞争导致银行放贷不够保守，高抵押要求进一步降低效率，并讨论了相关监管与破产规则。
Commercial banks frequently encounter optimistic entrepreneurs whose perceptions are biased by wishful thinking. Bankers are left with a difficult screening problem: sepa-rating realistic entrepreneurs from optimists who may be clever, knowledgeable, and completely sincere. We build a game-theoretic model of the screening process. We show that although entrepreneurs may practice self-restraint to signal realism, com-petition may lead banks to be insufficiently conservative in their lending, thus reducing capital-market efficiency. High collateral requirements decrease efficiency further. We discuss bank regulation and bankruptcy rules in connection with the problems that optimistic entrepreneurs present. 1.