Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality
分析酸雨这类非本地化污染问题中，环保局与公用事业委员会分别代表不同利益群体，在信息不对称下进行非合作博弈，并与合作均衡比较。
With a nonlocalized pollution externality, different groups bear the costs and benefits of abatement. In the case of acid rain these groups are, respectively, consumers in the Midwest and pollutees in the Northeast. These groups have conflicting interests that are represented, respectively, by a public utilities commission and an environmental regulator. We analyze a model in which the Environmental Protection Agency, acting as a von Stackelberg leader, regulates pollution, and the public utility commission regulates the price for a monopolist that has private information about the effectiveness of its abatement alternatives. We characterize a noncooperative equilibrium and compare it with a cooperative equilibrium. * A nonlocalized pollution externality poses special regulatory problems when the benefits and the costs of abatement are borne by distinct groups whose interests are represented by different regulatory agencies. A relevant example is acid rain, which is believed to be caused in part by coal-fired, electricity generating plants. These emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, which upon contact with moisture in the atmosphere form acid that falls with rain. Measures to reduce these emissions are of concern to the residents of the states in which the coal-fired generating plants are located because abatement costs increase the prices they pay for electricity. A number of plans have been proposed for distributing those costs more broadly, but the costs of reducing the emissions of generating plants located in Ohio will likely be borne in large part by Ohio consumers and utilities, while the benefits from abatement will largely be realized by the residents of the Northeast and Canada. The control of a nonlocalized externality such as acid rain raises the issue of the relationship between the environmental regulator, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the public utility commission. The former is responsible for achieving an acceptable balance between the damage from pollution and the cost of abatement. The latter is responsible for pricing electricity on the basis of the costs of production and pollution control. One possibility is that cooperation between the two regulators leads to the joint regulation of emissions and prices. Cooperation would internalize the conflicting interests and mandates of the regulators, but the distributive consequences of the regulatory alternatives inhibit cooperation. The public utility commission, for example, has an interest in avoiding abate