Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration
研究高管薪酬包结构的影响因素，重点分析延迟补偿如何作为“绑定”高管与公司的手段，并利用1970年代初的数据解释理论。
ABSTRACT In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long‐run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.