The Welfare Cost of Rationing-By-Queuing across Markets: Theory and Estimates from the U.S. Gasoline Crises
运用微观经济学和福利经济学分析跨市场的最优配给，并估计美国1973-1974年和1979年汽油危机中因跨市场分配不当造成的实际福利损失。
Governments sometimes impose price controls and nonprice rationing-by-queuing. Profit-seeking firms occasionally ration by putting their customers on "allocation." Following Barzel [1974] and Deacon and Sonstelie [1985], we take the decision to ration as a given and analyze it, employing standard microeconomics and applied welfare economics. This paper adds to the literature by focusing on optimally rationing a good across markets. Further, we estimate the actual welfare cost of improper allocation across markets in the U. S. gasoline crises of 1973–1974 and 1979.