A Consumer as an Entrant in the Norwegian Cement Market
研究了挪威水泥市场中两种进入者的策略，其中一种进入者原是现有企业的消费者，通过进口自用进入市场，并在其他进入者被阻止时仍会进行沉没投资以获取第二供应商。
This paper sheds light on the strategy of two entrants in the Norwegian cement market, where both started importing cement. One entrant was an initial consumer of the incumbent's product and, thus, imported for own consumption. The author demonstrates that this type of entrant will undertake a sunk investment to have access to a second supplier in cases where other types of entrants are deterred. Both types of entrants must accept a high import price if the incumbent can purchase the exclusive right to import from foreign suppliers. The author finds that the two observed entry attempts are consistent with the model's predictions. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.