An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis
用真实世界数据检验了代理理论中的相对绩效评价假设，发现基于相对绩效的合同能剔除共同冲击，从而更准确评估代理人行为。
The principal-agent framework has become a widely used paradigm in accounting and economics for analyzing issues in performance evaluation, management control, and the design of incentive systems. While recent work in experimental economics has begun to examine empirically some of the underlying assumptions and implications of agency theory (see Baiman and Lewis [1989] and Kirby [forthcoming]), few precise hypotheses have been tested using real-world or naturally-occurring data. One exception has been the empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation (RPE) hypothesis. Agency theory suggests that there are benefits associated with evaluating agents on the basis of their relative performances when the agents' performances are affected by a common term (e.g., see Diamond and Verrecchia [1982] and Holmstrom [1979; 1982]). Specifically, a relative performance-based contract can remove the common shock term from an agent's performance, which enables a better evaluation of the agent's actions.