Rivals' Search for Buried Treasure: Competition and Duplication in R&D
构建了一个研发竞赛模型，其中每家企业每期在两个研究项目中选一个，仅一个项目有成功概率且未知。对称信息下存在策略性搜索，分析了奖励共享或独享时的重复与效率问题。
We model an R&D race in which each fi rm decides in each period between two research projects, only one of which has positive success probability and it is not known which. There is symmetric information and hence scope for strategic search. If the prize is shared when discovery is simultaneous there is too much duplication of projects. If neither is rewarded in this event then equilibrium is efficient unless projects have asymmetric costs, in which case there is a bias toward the high-cost project, or asymmetric success probabilities, in which case too little duplication is possible. If one firm is informed, it may choose the wrong project to put the other off the scent.