SAVING DOLPHINS: BOYCOTTS, TRADE SANCTIONS, AND UNOBSERVABLE TECHNOLOGY*
研究消费者抵制如何影响外国出口商的技术选择，即使技术不可观察，抵制威胁也能促使企业采用消费者偏好的技术，并比较不同贸易政策的效果。
Consumers boycott some goods because they do not approve the ways they are manufactured. I examine the efficacy of boycotts and the role of trade policy in influencing the foreign exporter's technology choice. Even when its technology choice is unobservable, boycott threats can prompt the foreign firm to adopt the technology consumers prefer. Import policy can augment this effect, but when boycotts can have a substantial impact on demand, a use of ad valorem tariffs yields the unintended result. Specific tariffs and quotas are free of this defect, but specific tariffs are more effective than quotas in addressing consumers' concern.