Sharing the wealth: social comparisons and pay dispersion in the CEO's top team
研究CEO高管团队成员间的社会比较如何影响董事会设定的薪酬差距，发现成员相似性高时薪酬差距较小，且薪酬差距过大会损害公司绩效，尤其当少数高管获得大量股票期权且股价波动大时。
Abstract The antecedents and consequences of pay dispersion are studied using theory that focuses on the social comparisons that occur among members of the CEO's top team. Results from a sample of large public firms indicate that when members of this elite group were similar on a variety of dimensions, and thus likely to compare their pay, the board allowed less dispersion. In addition, pay dispersion was negatively related to company performance, particularly when it exceeded what could be justified by characteristics of the industry, firm, or team. But the strength of that relationship depended on how uniformly members of the team would benefit from subsequent performance gains. Specifically, the negative effect was particularly strong in firms where major differences in compensation—that is, some executives were given significantly more stock options—combined with a volatile stock price to provide only a few team members with the opportunity to realize very large financial gains in the future. The study demonstrates that the social‐psychological factors that affect comparisons among members of the CEO's top team impact the board's pay setting process, which in turn affects pay dispersion, and ultimately firm performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.