On the Sustainability of International Coordination
用动态一般均衡模型研究部分国家协调宏观经济政策的可持续性，发现适当规模的协调联盟能克服搭便车问题，实现帕累托改进。
The motivation of this paper rests on the attempts by some groups of countries to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. Implicit in these attempts is the notion that coordination by at least some countries is better than zero coordination. The authors use a dynamic general equilibrium model of international coordination to study the properties of a partial coordination scheme. They find that, indeed, some coordination is Pareto superior to zero coordination. Although a free-riding incentive problem arises in partial coordination schemes, such schemes are sustainable provided the relative size of the coalition is chosen 'appropriately.' Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.