Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors
在最优契约框架下分析公司借款的债权人数量、担保权益分配及债权人投票规则如何影响债务违约后的重新谈判，并权衡其防止违约与违约后低效的成本。
Within an optimal contracting framework, the authors analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from. They also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern rule renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to the authors' analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager's control. The optimal debt structure balances these effects. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.