主观概率与囚徒困境

Subjective Probability and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Management Science · 1986
被引 25
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

指出囚徒困境博弈中,最优策略的数学定义常与日常理解不符。通过引入决策者的主观概率,可以证明在重复囚徒困境中选择合作是合理的,并给出了确定最优策略的简单算法。

Abstract

The paradox involved in sequences of Prisoner's Dilemma games is due to the fact that game theoretic definitions of optimality rarely coincide with any natural meaning of the word. Decision makers should incorporate their beliefs and experience into any mathematical analysis of the games. Once this has been done, via subjective probabilities, use of the cooperative move in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games can often be justified. The paper provides a simple algorithm for determining an optimal strategy, once the decision maker's subjective probabilities have been specified.

主观概率囚徒困境最优策略迭代博弈