State Buildng by Bargaining for Monopoly Rents
从封建政治体系作为军事安全市场的命题出发，将国家形成解释为限制该市场竞争的结果，并基于三个历史案例分析了中世纪晚期和近代早期国家构建中利益集团与政治权威的讨价还价。
Starting from the proposition that the feudal political system functioned as a market for military security where no territorial monopolies and consequently no states in the modern sense of the word existed, state formation is here explained as the outcome of efforts to restrict competition in this market. The explanation draws on the theory of regulation which focuses on bargaining between interest groups and political authorities as the cause of the creation of entry barriers to markets. Which interest groups and authorities were concerned in late medieval and early modern state building is analyzed on the basis of three historical cases, two of which led to the creation of territorial monopolies of security while in one instance corresponding efforts failed.