The Welfare State as Provider of Accident Insurance in the Workplace: Efficiency and Distribution in Equilibrium
分析福利国家提供工作场所事故保险的均衡效应，发现这种保险不会导致企业安全激励下降，反而可能比完全经验评级产生更高的安全水平，并论证了最优所得税应具有累进性。
The welfare state provides universal insurance for workers against accidents in the workplace. In equilibrium, this insurance does not generate adverse safety incentives to firms. Non-internalised insurance makes workers sort themselves nonoptimally to firms, and to choose higher individual effort levels to prevent accidents as compared to insurance schemes that are internalised in the market. Welfare state insurance may therefore generate higher safety levels than perfect experience rating, not lower. An optimal income taxation scheme in the welfare state implies progressive taxation. The optimal tax level increases with the extent of the welfare state.