Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
研究不知情接收者与知情但向上偏误发送者之间的战略沟通，发送者说谎需承担成本。模型显示语言膨胀自然出现，发送者几乎总是声称比完全信息下更高的类型，且无论说谎成本大小，都存在不完全分离和最高消息上的部分混同。该框架统一了廉价谈话和可验证披露博弈在利益冲突大时的极端预测，并讨论了信息可操纵程度如何影响授权与沟通之间的权衡。
I study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed Receiver and an informed but upwardly biased Sender. The Sender bears a cost of lying, or more broadly, of misrepresenting his private information. The main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment, where the Sender (almost) always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information. Regardless of the intensity of lying cost, there is incomplete separation, with some pooling on the highest messages. The degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost. The analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap-talk and verifiable disclosure games, unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest. I use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade-off between delegation and communication.