The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
研究1990年代21个主要新兴市场的大型私有银行，发现约25%在七年样本期内倒闭，且政治因素显著延迟政府对倒闭银行的干预，选举前银行更少被接管或吊销执照。
This paper studies large private banks in 21 major emerging markets in the 1990s. It first demonstrates that bank failures are very common in these countries: about 25 percent of these banks failed during the seven-year sample period. The paper also shows that political concerns play a significant role in delaying government interventions to failing banks. Failing banks are much less likely to be taken over by the government or to lose their licenses before elections than after. This result is robust to controlling for macroeconomic and bank-specific factors, a new party in power, early elections, outstanding loans from the IMF, as well as country-specific, time-independent factors. This finding implies that much of the within-country clustering in emerging market bank failures is directly due to political concerns.