Minimum Bill Contracts: Theory and Policy
研究了最低账单条款在长期合同中的效率影响，发现其促进而非阻碍对变化的适应，并质疑减少天然气合同中最低账单义务的干预提案。
This paper examines the efficiency implications of minimum bill cont racts, and concludes that minimum bill provisions promote rather than impede efficient adaptation to changing circumstances. In particular , minimum bills provide a simple mechanism by which parties faced wit h uncertain demand and rising marginal cost can approximate joint-pro fit maximizing payment schedules in transaction-specific relationship s governed by long-term contracts. The paper also questions the merit of proposals for legislative or regulatory intervention to reduce mi nimum bill obligations in natural gas contracts, and considers the ap propriate legal status of these provisions in the event of contractua l failure. Copyright 1988 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.