Earnings Management to Minimize Superfund Clean‐up and Transaction Costs*
研究1981至1995年间612家潜在责任方在超级基金法案下，是否通过减少利润的应计项目操纵盈余，以降低清理和交易成本，并发现支持这一假设的稳健证据。
Abstract We investigate whether firms identified as potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (more commonly known as Superfund) appear to manipulate earnings to minimize their exposure to Superfund clean‐up and transaction costs. We analyze the discretionary accrual behavior of 612 PRPs from 1981 to 1995 and increase the power of our tests by identifying those PRPs with the most incentive to manage earnings during PRP identification years. The results provide robust evidence consistent with the hypothesis that these PRPs use income‐reducing discretionary accruals during PRP identification years in an attempt to minimize Superfund clean‐up and transaction costs. We also consider whether PRPs' incentives to manage earnings change in response to a change in the EPA regulatory regime and find modest evidence consistent with our conjecture.