Reimbursing insurance carriers: The case of ‘muface’ in the spanish health care system
基于采购与监管文献，分析西班牙公务员医疗体系MUFACE中按人头付费的财务激励，发现理论上会出现合同前逆向选择和合同后风险选择。
This article aims at contributing to the analysis of financial incentives in managed competition, on the basis of the literature on procurement and regulation under incomplete information. More specifically, we focus on MUFACE, the publicly funded health care system for Spanish civil servants and dependants. MUFACE makes up an internal market, where competing public and private insurers are reimbursed a flat capitation payment. Some of our results are that theoretically, both pre-contractual (adverse) selection of insurers contracted by MUFACE, and post-contractual risk selection of enrollees undertaken by insurers, should occur under flat capitation.