Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study
通过实验研究在长期重复公共品博弈中，代价高昂的惩罚选项对合作和社会福利的影响，发现完美监督下惩罚严厉性单调提高净收益，而不完美监督下呈U型关系。
This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship. Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing.