Simple Market Equilibria with Rationally Inattentive Consumers
研究了理性疏忽消费者在不确定企业报价时，通过付费获取信息后的市场均衡，发现信息成本越高、企业数量越少则价格越高，且先验信息有利的企业会定价更高。
We study a market with rationally inattentive consumers who are unsure of the terms of the offers made by firms, but can acquire information about the terms at a cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price set by firms is continuously increasing in the cost of information for consumers and decreasing in the number of firms operating. In addition, favorable a priori information about a firm leads it to set a higher price, and a new entrant can increase demand for incumbents. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of information, firms selling low-quality products may choose to set the highest prices.