An Experimental Investigation of Retention and Rotation Requirements
通过实验比较四种制度（无要求、仅保留、仅轮换、两者兼有）下审计师的报告行为，发现轮换要求降低了审计师出具偏向管理层报告的可能性，而长期合作虽降低独立性但促使管理层增加投资。
We provide results from an experiment designed to assess whether mandatory rotation and/or retention of auditors increases auditors' independence by reducing their willingness to issue reports biased in favor of management. Auditors' reporting is compared across the following four regimes: one that does not require either rotation or retention, a second that requires retention only, a third that requires rotation only, and a fourth that requires both rotation and retention. We find that the rotation requirements in the third and fourth regimes decreased auditor‐subjects' willingness to issue biased reports, relative to the two regimes in which rotation was not imposed. In these other two regimes, however, many manager‐subjects voluntarily retained the same auditor‐subjects over multi‐periods. While the long running interactions between manager‐ and auditor‐subjects resulted in more favorable reports by auditor‐subjects (a lower level of independence), the established relationships also induced manager‐subjects to make higher investments.