Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
研究将n个物品和M金额分配给m人时，当M足够大，有效且无嫉妒的分配集合非空且有良好结构，不同正义标准导致唯一最优公平分配，且对M变化表现良好，与可分割物品的公平分配理论形成对比。
A set of n objects and an amount M of money is to be distributed among m people. Example: the objects are tasks and the money is compensation from a fixed budget. An elementary argument via constrained optimization shows that for M sufficiently large the set of efficient, envy free allocations is nonempty and has a nice structure. In particular, various criteria of justice lead to unique best fair allocations that are well behaved with respect to changes of M. This is in sharp contrast to the usual fair division theory with divisible goods.