Quality Choice, Trade Policy, and Firm Incentives
研究一个国内企业和一个外国企业在双寡头市场中如何选择产品质量，以及贸易政策如何影响这一选择。结论取决于企业是否面临质量提升的固定成本，且不完全信息会改变结论。
Quality choice is examined in a duopoly with one foreign and one domestic firm where consumers have similar preferences for quality but different preferences for brands. Firms make quality commitments prior to choosing price and policy intervention assumes several forms. The policy conclusions depend on whether firms face costs in raising product quality. In the absence of set-up costs, both domestic and foreign firms make socially optimal quality choices. In the presence of set-up costs, the foreign firm, and often the domestic firm, sets quality below the socially optimal level. Incomplete information alters these conclusions, however. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.