Endogenous Rationing in a Differentiated Product Duopoly
研究差异化产品Stackelberg双寡头中，企业在价格与数量或价格与服务能力上竞争时的均衡，发现配给作为内生均衡结果出现，且仅当产品接近替代时领导者才会配给。
In this paper, the authors characterize the equilibria of Stackelberg duopolies with differentiated products, where the firms are fighting either in prices and quantities or in prices and serving capacities. It is shown that in the price-quantity case there is always rationing by the leader, but in the price-serving capacity case the leader is rationing only if the goods are close substitutes. Hence, rationing may appear as an equilibrium results. This kind of equilibrium is specific to the Stackelberg competition. Rationing never appears in a duopoly (with the same strategy spaces) where the firm moves are simultaneous. Copyright 1989 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.