Supervision and Wages Across Industries
利用1977年收入动态面板调查的监督数据，分析不同行业的监督强度与工资差异的关系，发现高工资行业的监督并不比次级行业宽松，且监督差异不能解释行业间工资差异，这与效率工资理论中的偷懒模型相矛盾。
This paper uses supervision data from a supplement to the 1977 wave of the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics to examine differences in supervision and wages across industries and to evaluate relationships between supervision practices and interindustry wage differentials. The results demonstrate that workers in high-wage industries are supervised with equal or greater stringency than secondary sector workers. Further, the results offer no evidence that interindustry differences in monitoring contribute to interindustry wage differentials. Such findings appear to contradict explanations for industry wage premiums that are motivated by efficiency wage models of shirking. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.