转售价格维持与质量认证

Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification

RAND Journal of Economics · 1984
被引 249
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

解释为何转售价格维持(RPM)会用于那些看似不需要有形售前服务的产品,认为制造商通过RPM从信誉良好的经销商处购买质量或风格认证,即使制造商能通过拒绝交易来筛选经销商,仍会采用RPM。

Abstract

Resale price maintenance (RPM) has been applied to a number of products that do not seem to require tangible presale dealer services. This article explains why RPM might exist in these instances. We show that RPM will be adopted when a manufacturer wishes to purchase quality or style certification from reputable dealers. We demonstrate that manufacturers will desire to adopt RPM even when they are permitted to shape the set of stores handling their products through refusals to deal. Although we do not claim that this is the only explanation of RPM, we nevertheless believe that our explanation has wide applicability.

转售价格维持质量认证经销商服务制造商策略