On Strategic Control
澄清并补充了关于作者早期工作的评论，提出了两个新结果：一个构建了连续、匿名且尊重一致性和偏好接近性的社会选择规则，另一个则重申了不可能性定理，表明此类规则在相同条件下不存在。
The purpose of this note is to clarify and complement several comments on my work [Chichilnisky, 1980, 1982a], which appeared in this Journal: Baigent [1987], Nitzan [1989], and Baigent [1989]. I shall offer two new results. The first result constructs a continuous, anonymous social selection rule that respects unanimity and the proximity of preferences, for a large family of preferences (Theorem 1). This complements the result of Nitzan [1989] and Baigent's [1989] extension of it and is achieved by accepting, as they do, that social outcomes be optimal choices, rather than rankings of all possible choices or social preferences This result is of interest because it appears to contradict the original impossibility theorem of Chichilnisky, which establishes that, for the same family of preferences, social aggregation rules with these properties do not exist (Theorem 2).