Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance Marketing System
提出不同保险营销组织的出现是为了最小化正确匹配投保人风险与保险覆盖的成本，并通过分析薪酬合同和市场份额数据，发现独家经销在标准化产品线中更普遍，其代理人获得的基于利润的薪酬较少。
This article argues that different insurance marketing organizations arise as a means to minimize the costs of correctly matching policyholder risks with insurance coverage. When policyholders are easily sorted without sales agent participation in screening, exclusive dealing will be the preferred marketing organization; when agent information is important for risk placement, independent agency may be preferred. Empirical support for our theory is obtained from analysis of compensation contracts and market shares of the different marketing forms. Exclusive dealers are found to be prevalent in relatively standardized, homogeneous product lines and markets, and their agents receive less profit-based compensation than those of independent agency insurers. These findings are consistent with our theory.