Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision
研究了团队中员工有大量偷懒机会时，如何通过内疚、羞耻等浪费性制裁或晋升放缓来提供非正式激励，导致最优契约出现低绩效、宽容制裁和内生监督结构。
We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with underperformance, forgiving sanctioning schemes, and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally take on more assigned tasks than they intend to complete, leading to the concentration of supervisory responsibility in the hands of one or two agents.