Increasing Environmental Awareness to Protect the Global Commons — A Curmudgeon'S View
研究对称双边污染下，提高环境意识如何影响最优排放、纳什均衡排放及国际协议排放，发现可能加剧公地悲剧并增加欺骗动机。
Two countries suffering from symmetric bilateral pollution are considered. First, optimal emissions, Nash equilibrium emissions, and emissions negotiated in an international agreement are compared. Then, the effect of increasing environmental awareness on these emission levels is analyzed. Increasing environmental awareness may widen the gap between the social optimum and the Nash equilibrium, aggravating the tragedy of the commons. Also, even though inducing the countries to agree upon more ambitious reduction targets in international negotiations, it may strengthen the incentives to cheat. A broader concept of awareness may be needed to contribute to the solution of international environmental problems. Copyright 1997 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG