Political Business Cycles and Central Bank Independence
构建理性党派经济周期模型，分析工资合同跨越选举时工资设定者对选举结果的预期如何影响产出，并用20个OECD国家数据验证左翼政府增加产出但预期左翼执政会减少产出的结论，同时发现中央银行客观独立性可减少政治引发的经济周期。
This paper develops a dynamic model of Rational Partisan Business Cycles in which wage contracts overlap elections and wage setters have to make a prediction about the election result. Empirical analysis of 20 OECD countries supports the theoretical implication that left wing incumbents increase output, but increased expectation of a left wing regime reduces it. The model is extended to incorporate the effects of alternative measures of Central Bank Independence (CBI). The measure of objective independence outperforms the other measures and it is found that CBI reduces politically induced business cycles.