A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers
构建了一个私人慈善与公共转移同时决定的模型，发现政治均衡下政府过度提供公共转移，导致私人慈善为零，并用1920年代至今的数据验证了这一现象始于1930年代联邦干预慈善市场之时。
This paper explores a model where private charity and public transfers are determined simultaneously. In political equilibrium, the government "overprovides" public transfers, transferring more to the poor than altruistic taxpayers prefer. At this equilibrium, private charity is zero. Evidence for this result is found by examining various types of data from the 1920s to the present. While private charity currently exceeds $50 billion, very little of it goes to the poor. I provide evidence that this phenomenon of zero private charity began, as the model predicts, in the 1930s, the beginning of federal intervention in the charity market.