On Delegating Price Authority to a Regulated Firm
研究监管者如何通过补贴或税收机制，激励掌握需求信息的企业自主设定社会最优价格，可理解为一种随需求变化调整的两部定价方案。
This article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better information about demand conditions than does the regulator. The regulator would like to tie prices to the firm's private information in a socially optimal way. To do so, the regulator must induce the firm either truthfully to reveal private information or, equivalently, unilaterally to set socially optimal prices. This is accomplished by assessing lump-sum subsidies or taxes that depend in an appropriate way on the prices announced by the firm. This mechanism can be reinterpreted as a two-part tariff scheme whereby both the service fee and price per unit respond to shifting demand conditions.