Asset Salvageability and the Potential for Trade Restraint Through Merger
评估资产可回收性如何影响通过产业合并限制贸易的盈利性，证明合并后价格可能等于竞争价格，且资产可回收性会抑制价格涨幅。
This article evaluates impact of asset salvageability on the profitability of restraint of trade through industrial combination. In the case of merger either for monopoly or market dominance, a postmerger price equal to the premerger, competitive price is proved a reasonable possibility. Even in a declining industry, where noncompetitive pricing is unlikely to attract new firms, raising prices after merger may prove suboptimal. In cases where a postmerger price increase is optimal, asset salvageability is shown to have a restraining effect on the magnitude of the increase.