Competition, Disclosure and Signalling
研究了双寡头市场中企业通过信号传递而非自愿披露来沟通产品质量的动机，发现即使披露成本为零，所有企业都不披露也可能是唯一对称结果，为自愿披露不频繁提供了新解释。
Competition creates strategic incentives for firms to communicate private information about product quality through signalling rather than voluntary disclosure. In a duopoly where firms may disclose quality before setting prices and prices may signal quality, non‐disclosure by all firms may often be the unique symmetric outcome even if disclosure cost vanishes. A high‐quality firm may not disclose even if it has strong competitive advantage over a low‐quality rival. This provides an alternative explanation of infrequent voluntary disclosure. Although product information is always communicated whether or not firms disclose, signalling distortions may provide a rationale for mandatory disclosure regulation.