Preemptive Adoptions of an Emerging Technology
研究了寡头垄断市场中企业在技术持续进步且采用成本高昂时，如何选择采用时机，发现伯川德双寡头下会出现同一企业持续采用且利润为零的均衡模式，而古诺双寡头则不同。
Many oligopolies exhibit continuing technological change and lumpy costs of adopting new technologies. If firms choose adoption dates in a game of timing and if the downstream market structure is a Bertrand duopoly, the equilibrium adoption pattern displays rent-dissipating increasing dominance, i.e., all adoptions are by the same firm, and the discounted value of profits is zero. These results need not hold for other market structures, including Cournot duopoly. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.