Vertical Integration: Scale Distortions, Partial Integration, and the Direction of Price Change
在中间品垄断企业向前一体化进入可竞争下游产业的标准模型中，引入U形平均成本和上游进入压力，发现垄断定价会扭曲下游企业规模或投入比例，导致部分而非完全一体化，且价格在无上游进入时上升、有自由进入时下降。
Two new features are introduced in a standard model of forward vertical integration by an intermediate good monopolist into a contestable downstream industry. First, U-shaped average costs replace constant returns in the downstream industry. Second, the effect of subjecting the monopolist to the pressure of upstream entry is explored. It is found that monopoly pricing of the intermediate good can distort the scale as well as the input proportions of the downstream firms. Either distortion leads to integration, but here integration may be partial rather than full. Prices rise with partial integration when there is no upstream entry, but prices fall when upstream entry is free.