Relational Incentive Contracts
研究自我执行的关系合同设计，发现最优合同常呈简单稳定形式，但自我执行限制补偿承诺并影响激励。在隐藏信息下，代理人可能无论成本条件都提供相同低效努力；在道德风险下，最优合同仅涉及两个补偿水平，即使绩效主观，合同在绩效差时终止。
Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden information, it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions. With moral hazard, optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation. This is true even if performance measures are subjective, in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance.