Efficiency with Non‐Convexities: Extending the “Scandinavian Consensus” Approaches
扩展了基于支付意愿的两种斯堪的纳维亚共识方法（Wicksell-Foley公共竞争均衡和Lindahl估值均衡），以处理非凸性作为公共环境的一部分，并证明了福利经济学基本效率定理的对应版本。
There are two distinct “Scandinavian consensus” approaches to public good supply, both based on agents' willingness to pay. A Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium arises from a negative consensus in which no change of public environment, together with associated taxes and subsidies which finance it, will be unanimously approved. Alternatively, in a Lindahl or valuation equilibrium, charges for the public environment induce a positive consensus. To allow general non‐convexities to be regarded as aspects of the public environment, we extend recent generalizations of these equilibrium notions and prove counterparts to both the usual fundamental efficiency theorems of welfare economics.