Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination
通过实验研究职业棒球自由球员市场的匹配问题，比较了现行制度、一种被仲裁者判定非法的变体制度，以及一种新提出的匹配机制，发现新机制具有多项理想特性。
This article presents the results of an experimental study investigating the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects using market-like mechanisms. The object of study is the market for professional baseball players in their free-agent year. The authors investigate both the current free-agency system and a variant of the current system instituted informally by the teams and ruled illegal by arbitrators. They then propose and test a new alternative matching mechanism, which proves to have quite a few desirable characteristics. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.