Implicit Labor Contracts and Free Entry
扩展了Kihlstrom-Laffont的自由进入模型，引入劳动力现货市场，研究存在隐性劳动合同时的均衡存在性与效率，并分析雇主比工人更厌恶风险的条件。
The model investigated here is an adaptation of the free-entry model introduced in Kihlstrom-Laffont [1979]. In that model the only labor market is one in which employers pay workers an ex ante guaranteed wage. In the model of this paper, there is also a spot market for labor. In the earlier sections of the paper, the existence of the equilibrium is established, and its efficiency is investigated. In this analysis it is assumed that all individuals are identical. In the later sections we drop this assumption and investigate conditions under which employers are more risk-averse than workers.