The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
研究两人无限重复博弈中，当玩家偏好同时取决于博弈收益和策略复杂度时，纳什均衡的结构，推导出均衡的必要条件，发现引入实施成本会导致策略和收益上的显著不连续性。
The authors study the Nash equilibria of a two-person, infinitely-repeated game in which players' preferences depend on repeated game payoffs and the complexity of the strategies they use. The model considered is that of A. Rubinstein (1986). Necessary conditions on the structure of the equilibria are derived. These results place significant restrictions on equilibrium payoffs. The results suggest that the introduction of implementation costs results in a striking discontinuity in the Nash equilibrium sets in terms of strategies and payoffs. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.