Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Policy: A Test Using Antitakeover Legislation
利用美国各州反收购法作为外生变量，采用双重差分法检验公司治理对股利支付的影响，发现管理者免受收购威胁时股利支付率和倾向均下降，对治理差和小公司影响更显著。
Managers strongly prefer not to pay dividends as dividend payouts reduce the amount of cash subject to managerial discretion ( Easterbrook, 1984 ; Jensen, 1986 ). Previous empirical tests of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout policy employ endogenous measures of this agency problem. Using a relatively exogenous measure that incorporates state antitakeover laws and the differences‐in‐differences approach, our analysis indicates that dividend payout ratios and propensities fall when managers are insulated from takeovers. The impact of antitakeover laws on dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance and small firms.