Disclosure When the Market Is Unsure of Information Endowment of Managers
研究当投资者不确定管理者是否拥有私有信息时，管理者是否会完全披露信息。基于逆向选择理论，完全披露是均衡结果，但Dye（1985）指出不确定性可能导致部分披露。
Whether insiders (e.g., managers, sellers) fully disclose their private information has been a research interest in accounting as well as in finance and economics. Grossman and Hart [1980] and Grossman [1981] support full disclosure of private information based on an adverse selection argument. That is, when insiders are known to withhold information, outsiders (e.g., investors, consumers) discount the quality of goods insiders deal with to the lowest possible value consistent with their discretionary disclosure. This in turn drives insiders to make full disclosure. On the other hand, Dye [1985] has recently demonstrated the possibility of partial disclosure based on a scenario in which investors are not sure whether managers are endowed with private information.1 In his scenario, given no information disclosure by managers, investors are uncertain whether the nondisclosure is due to nonexistence of information or due to its adverse content. This uncertainty on the part of investors deters the adverse selection and leads to partial disclosure